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personality variables tend to be present in clusters (people are often anxious, 
insecure, and hypersuggestible, for instance), and many subjects of religious 
experience escape all of them; and it is clear that the other types of patho-
logical factors (e.g., hallucinogens), whose presence is much easier to detect, 
are absent from the vast majority of cases of religious experience (p. 223). 
In other words, the clustering effect limits the evidential force of there being 
many pathological forms of reduction. Nor, second, does she believe the 
non-pathological forms of counter-explanation have a cumulative force: 
Atheists such as J. L. Mackie admit that no natural history of religious 
experience so far developed can adequately account for the phenomenon of 
religious experience as a whole. He is confident, however, that in combina-
tion they could provide 'an adequate and much more economical naturalistic 
alternative' to religious explanations, so that even psychologically sound 
religious experiences do not escape the reductionist net. But Mackie offers 
no such account himself. Presumably the combined theory would have to be 
extremely complex ... However, it would still be difficult to show that this 
was a complete account. In fact, most theists would agree with Mackie that 
each natural history discussed above 'correctly identifies factors which have 
contributed to some extent to religion', but that is far from admitting that 
together they constitute a highly probable and complete reductionist account 
of religion (p. 230). 
Mackie, it is alleged, goes beyond the evidence represented by past reduc-
tionist successes in claiming that all religious experiences are vulnerable to 
reduction. 
This response seems too quick and optimistic, however. Unless one places 
a tremendous weight upon the principle of credulity, to claim that religious 
experience has "evidential force" for others as well as the experiencer is, in 
my view, to incur an obligation to at least show that there is not a "trend" of 
successful counter-explanation. Otherwise, such a trend would make it prob-
able that the remaining experiences can be reduced just like the others have 
been. That is, successful religious counter-explanations may have a cumula-
tive effect, at least in terms of affecting the plausibility of believing that some 
religious experiences will survive reduction. Franks Davis is to be praised 
for drawing attention to the complexity of these appraisals; perhaps her book 
will serve as a stepping stone to a full response to the cumulative counter-
explanation challenge. 
Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, by M. 
Jamie Ferreira. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pp. 168. $39.95 (cloth). 
CAROLINE J. SIMON, Hope College. 
Professor M. Jamie Ferreira's Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in 
Kierkegaardian Faith brings an impressive array of resources to bear on the 
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question of how best to interpret Kierkegaard's concept of a "leap of faith." 
Ferreira cites writers as diverse as Samuel Coleridge, Donald Davidson, Flan-
nery O'Connor and Richard Rorty on topics ranging from philosophy of 
religion to metaphor, from romantic love to paradigm shifts, from literary 
criticism to irrationality. The result enriches our understanding of 
Kierkegaard, faith and conversion. Her work is densely-woven, rich, and 
suggestive; this review will, at best, highlight some of the main lines of 
argument and important questions raised by Transforming Vision. 
As the book's subtitle emphasizes, Professor Ferreira is interested in reas-
sessing the roles of imagination and will in transitions to faith. She is con-
cerned to counter the "deeply held modern prejudice" that Kierkegaard is a 
volitionist with regard to faith (p. 147). On the volitionist model of faith, the 
potential believer sees himself as having to choose among options which are 
all equally 'real' possibilities for belief. He makes "an intentional, purposeful, 
deliberate, self-conscious, or reflective 'act of will'" (p. 7) in choosing to 
believe one among these options. Choosing is taken to be separable from 
appreciating the options and is a "leap" which bridges the gap between 
knowing what the options are and appropriating one of them (p. 8). The role 
of imagination, on the volitionist account, is "to 'produce candidates for 
belief,' after which 'the will decides which to believe'" (p. 10). 
Professor Ferreira contrasts the volitionist model with what she argues is 
the Kierkegaardian model of faith. On this model, the "leap" of faith is a 
passionate, imaginative "revisioning" which is more like a Gestalt or para-
digm shift or the act of apprehending a metaphor than a deliberate decision 
(pp. 72-81). Preparation for such a transition can be deliberate, but this brings 
one to a critical threshold, the crossing of which is not itself a deliberate act. 
"We can choose to look for what we cannot choose to see; looking at the 
world in a new way cannot be achieved by the same kind of decision which 
effects a looking for a new way of seeing" (p. 121). Faith is "an imaginative 
gathering, a synthesis and extension by imagination-which effects a reori-
enting shift of perspective" (p. 105). It involves a surrender (a finding-one-
self-engaged) which cannot be directly willed (p. 117) and which is both 
active and passive (p. 87). It is free "without being self-consciously inten-
tional and without having an explicit acknowledgement of a variety of op-
tions" because it is not necessary or compelled (p. 39). It is also cognitively 
efficacious, incorporating elements of both continuity and discontinuity: 
The letting go or surrender assumes an imaginative suspension because it is 
a paradoxical seeing of what is both not yet there and already there, for 
sometimes it is only by putting-together imaginatively what could be there 
that we are able to recognize what is in some sense already there .... More-
over, such a shift in perspective arising from imaginative activity-a seeing 
things together differently-would be a free, qualitative transition or leap as 
much as any deliberate, self-conscious decision would (p. 107). 
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Besides an enriched role for the imagination, this model also involves 
seeing the will as appetitive reason or rational desire rather than as volition 
(p. 154). Choice with regard to worldviews or love-objects just is becoming 
decisively interested, rather than being a separable decision to adopt a stance 
(p. 127). Decision, on this model, is "a moment of realization, of becoming 
'thoroughly aware' of what was already decided" (p. 158). 
Ferreira has made a convincing case that the volitionist is mistaken if she 
thinks that all leaps of faith are like e.g. the decision to jump (or not) from 
the side of a swimming pool which is clearly seen in broad daylight. In 
contrast, Ferreira wants us to see what Kierkegaardian faith is more like the 
luxuriantly complex scene, set deep in a Puget Sound island's forest, deftly 
portrayed at the end of Annie Dillard's recent novel, The Living: 
The forest floor was soft and familiar underfoot: the papery, pitchy fir cones 
stuck to Hugh's bare feet as they had when he was a boy in Goshen. The 
dense welter of trees hid the sky completely. After a long walk, he heard 
voices. Will Ruffin called to him, Vinnie called to him, and held the lantern 
up to find the fir trunk down which their voices fell. He climbed the tree 
one-handed on many rungs, emerged at a high platform and pulled himself 
up. 
Hugh found a dozen unrecognizable people on the platform, and heard un-
familiar voices .... Hugh held the lantern aloft and saw it illumine the stiff 
boughs of trees; he set the lantern down. He stripped to his union suit, and 
somebody handed him the heavy, knotted rope .... Before his eyes in every 
direction he saw nothing: no pond, no ocean, no forest, sky, nor any horizon, 
only unmixed blackness. 
'Swing out,' the voices said in the darkness. 
'Push from the platform, and when you're all the way out, let go.' 
When? he thought. Where? 
The heavy rope pulled at him. He carried it to the platform edge. He hitched 
up on the knot and launched out. As he swung through the air, trembling, he 
saw the blackness give way below, like a parting of clouds, to a deep patch 
of stars on the ground. It was the pond, he hoped, the hole in the woods 
reflecting the sky. He judged the instant and let go; he flung himself loose 
into the stars.· 
Ferreira does not herself give such an example, but it contains analogues of 
the features of Kierkegaardian faith. Here, the elements of activity and pas-
sivity, continuity and discontinuity, community and individuality, pull and 
push, concrete actuality and transcendence, seeing, not-quite-seeing, not-yet-
seeing, and seeing-as intertwine. Ferreira performs the valuable service of 
helping us see that many come to faith through an analogously complex 
transition. 
One goal of Transforming Vision is to argue that Kierkegaard is neither a 
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prescriptive nor a descriptive vo1itionist. As a means to this, the book contains 
careful textual arguments for the central role of imagination in Kierkegaard's 
account of faith. Some of these arguments rest on Ferreira's often repeated 
assertion that it is "the distinctive function of imagination to hold elements 
in tension" (p. 5, see also pp. 13, 32, 62, 90, 109, 126). Given this assumption, 
Ferreira can argue that Kierkegaard implicitly appeals to imagination when-
ever he discusses paradox, passion or possibility. For example, she argues 
that "insofar as the transition to faith is seen in terms of 'passion' as well as 
'leap,' the implicit category of paradox-of tension between opposites-
qualifies the category of leap by bringing in imaginative activity" (p. 13). 
The argument that Kierkegaard himself thought that only imagination can 
hold elements in tension appears to be indirect, resting on the Kierkegaardian 
pseudonym "Climacus" and its connection with the sixth century author of 
The Heavenly Ladder coupled with the ladder's use among medieval theolo-
gians as a symbol for imagination, taken as the mediating faculty between 
reason and the senses (pp. 11-12). Some may doubt that this will bear the 
weight which Ferreira's interpretation puts on it. Even those who are con-
vinced that Kierkegaard thought of imagination as exclusively having this 
function may question whether it is wise for us to endorse this view. One 
might see this claim and its defense as an unhelpful reversion to faculty 
psychology. 
However, the value of Ferreira's insightful description of Kierkegaardian 
faith does not hinge on this issue; her characterization need not appeal to a 
reified "faculty of imagination" or insupportable claims about its "function." 
A much more important issue is just how Ferreira sees Kierkegaardian faith 
as relevant to volitionism. Her interpretive counterclaim to volitionism ap-
pears to be that Kierkegaard is a Kierkegaardian prescriptivist-true faith as 
opposed to the "faith" of those in Christendom involves suspension, engage-
ment and a transformative revisioning. It is less clear whether Ferreira is 
recommending that we should be descriptive Kierkegaardians or prescriptive 
Kierkegaardians. To be a descriptive Kierkegaardian (in the strong sense) 
would be to think that no one ever does make the transition to faith in the 
way volitionists claim one does. Since Ferreira views her proposal as deline-
ating "an alternative reading of the human activity required in the actual 
transition" to faith (p. 145), this may be her view. But supporting this claim 
would necessitate careful examination of many conversion stories, preferably 
from a wide spectrum of Christian traditions and perhaps others as well 
(Ferreira cites less than a handful, p. 105ff). 
To be a prescriptive Kierkegaardian would be to think that "true" conver-
sion is never a mere act of volition or that Kierkegaardian conversion is 
preferable to volitional conversion. Advocates of such a view would seem to 
have two choices when faced with someone whose conversion story takes a 
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volitionist line: see such people as misdescribing their own experience or see 
their "conversion" as somehow substandard. Either alternative might give one 
pause; however, one can hypothesize about Kierkegaardian reasons for such 
a claim. For example, one could doubt that 'will power' is ever enough to 
engage decisively one's being, arguing that weighing and making a deliberate 
choice among equally real options would at best bring one to Christendom, 
not to Christianity. Or, one might apply Ferreira's very interesting suggestions 
about the role of the understanding and critical appraisal in Kierkegaardian 
faith (pp. 129-144) by arguing that volitionist conversion would be irrational 
in ways that Kierkegaardian conversion would not. A filling out and evalu-
ation of such lines of argument would be a worthwhile extension of Ferreira's 
project. 
An alternative would be to take the volitionist and the Kierkegaardian to 
be describing two different, but equally valid, modes of conversion (a position 
one might call weak Kierkegaardianism or weak volitionism, depending on 
one's initial loyalties). After all, God's house has many mansions and the 
Spirit "blows where it wills." Perhaps there are leaps and leaps. It may be 
that many more conversions are like Dillard's breathtaking description of 
Hugh's plunge into a Puget Sound pond than like the more prosaic decision 
to jump from the side of a well-illumined swimming pool; we would have 
to, as Wittgenstein so often recommends, look and see. But, within the Chris-
tian tradition, we should also humbly keep in mind that we see ourselves as 
well as others "through a glass darkly." 
NOTE 
1. Annie Dillard, The Living (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 397. 
An Apology for Apologetics, by Paul J. Griffiths. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1991. Pp. xii and 113. $16.95 (paper). 
JAMES WETZEL, Colgate University. 
This is a polemical book, written to challenge conventional academic wisdom 
on the value of religious apologetics. Griffiths would like the university to 
remain open to those who would, as scholars, advocate the truth of a particu-
lar tradition. His proposal is striking, to put it mildly. Religious advocacy and 
scholarly objectivity have not commonly been thought compatible. In the 
Western academy, a murky religious pluralism has been the order of the day. 
Departments of religion encourage the comparative study of religion, as long 
as that remains a descriptive task, but they generally discourage comparative 
evaluation. In part this is because individual religious traditions are demand-
ing objects of study, and very few of us are in a position to make substantive 
